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Schizophrenia: a critical psychiatry perspective 
 
Abstract 
Purpose of review: The term ‘schizophrenia has been hotly contested over recent years. The 
current review explores the meanings of the term, whether it is valid and helpful and how 
alternative conceptions of severe mental disturbance would shape clinical practice.  
Recent findings: Schizophrenia is a label that implies the presence of a biological disease, but 
no specific bodily pathology has been demonstrated, and the language of ‘illness’ and 
‘disease’ is ill-suited to the complexities of mental health problems. Neither does the concept 
of schizophrenia delineate a group of people with similar patterns of behaviour and outcome 
trajectories. This is not to deny that some people show disordered speech and behaviour and 
associated mental suffering, but more generic terms, such as ‘psychosis’ or just ‘madness,’ 
would be preferable because they are less strongly associated with the disease model, and 
enable the uniqueness of each individual’s situation to be recognised.  
Summary: The disease model implicit in current conceptions of schizophrenia obscures the 
underlying functions of the mental health system; the care and containment of people who 
behave in distressing and disturbing ways. A new social framework is required that makes 
mental health services transparent, fair and open to democratic scrutiny.      
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Schizophrenia: a critical psychiatry perspective 
 
Introduction 
Over the last few decades, several commentators have challenged the concept of 
schizophrenia, and argued for different ways of framing the variety of problems the term 
currently designates. A critical psychiatry perspective attempts to shed light on these views 
and to explore their implications for the practical, clinical management of these problems.  
Schizophrenia as a disease 
Thomas Szasz referred to schizophrenia as the ‘sacred symbol’ of modern psychiatry (1). 
Like all other psychiatric diagnoses that lack a confirmed histopathological basis, 
schizophrenia, for Szasz, is an invented term applied to a variety of behaviours that society 
has deemed abnormal and undesirable.  
Szasz is well known for his criticism of the idea that what we refer to as ‘mental illness’ is a 
‘disease, just like any other,’ and for his views that the medicalization of the ‘problems of 
living’ acts as a mechanism for the social control of unwanted behaviour (2). Many people 
might agree that psychiatry has shown a tendency, exaggerated in recent years, for the 
inappropriate medicalization of normal behaviours and emotions, such as grief, sadness, 
shyness and childhood behaviour problems, but common discourse and academic consensus 
continues to refer to schizophrenia as a bona fide ‘disease’ in the sense that Szasz uses the 
term ‘disease’ (a condition that arises from a confirmed abnormality of bodily function) (2).  
Indeed, Kraeplin formulated the concept of dementia praecox with the goal of delineating 
something whose biological origins could then be uncovered (1). Similarly, modern versions 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, from the third edition of 1980, aimed to produce a 
reliable diagnosis which would help research identify the underlying pathology. In this sense 
therefore, the idea that schizophrenia is a disease is inherent in the concept.  
As other critics have pointed out, however, 100 years of research has failed to produce 
evidence of any defect in the structure or function of the brain, or any other part of the body, 
that is specific to schizophrenia (3). The most consistent evidence presented as discriminating 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia comes from studies showing reduced brain size and 
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larger brain cavities in the former compared with the latter. These differences started to be 
identified in brain scans when computerised tomography was developed in the 1980s, and 
were replicated using MRI technology in the 1990s. However, as with other areas of 
biochemical and physiological research, important differences between people with 
schizophrenia and control subjects were not adequately accounted for. In particular, most 
studies made no allowance for the fact that overall people with schizophrenia have a lower IQ, 
which is known to be associated with smaller brain size (4). Moreover, effects of treatment 
with antipsychotics and other drugs were ignored, until recently, when it was confirmed in 
animal and human studies that exposure to antipsychotic drugs can reduce brain size (5,6).     
Despite repeated assertions that schizophrenia is a neurological disease, there is no evidence 
of any particular biological characteristic that distinguishes people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia thus remains a condition that is defined by unusual talk and 
behaviour. Although Szasz was widely criticised during his lifetime because his position was 
understood to be a denial of the realities of the suffering, distress and aggravation that can 
accompany the occurrence of phenomena we generally identify as ‘schizophrenia,’ he did, in 
fact, acknowledge that ‘these differences in behaviour and speech may moreover be gravely 
disturbing to the so-called schizophrenic person, or to those around him, or to all concerned’ 
(1, P 191).  
The fact that some people sometimes develop unwarranted interpretations of their own 
experiences and show associated bizarre and concerning behaviours is undeniable. The 
position held by many who would identify themselves with ‘critical psychiatry’ is not a 
denial of the “reality” of adverse and troubling states of mind, but the suitability of 
identifying them, when they do occur, with medical terminology. The terms ‘illness’ and 
‘disease’ have well developed meanings and implications which might not usefully apply to 
troubled states of mind (7). When used in its native habitat, that is physical medicine, ‘illness,’ 
for example, refers to a state of disablement and discomfort generally attributed to natural 
world causes beyond the control of the victim; ‘disease’ refers to an explanation of the illness 
employing knowledge derived from natural sciences which enables the illness to be 
understood as the result of disturbed anatomy or physiology (8,9).  
The assumption that mental disorders represent disease entities draws down the specific 
arrangements of the sick role onto suffer and helper alike. The suffering person is excused 
responsibility for their actions, but obliged to forego agency and submit to paternalism (10). 
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Although this can be a helpful response to a bodily illness, especially if acute and life 
threatening, the obligations and consequences of the sick role are less suited for mental health 
difficulties (11).  
 
Schizophrenia as behavioural deviance 
Alternatively, the term ‘schizophrenia’ could derive its legitimacy, not by reference to its 
presumed disease status, but by encapsulating a recognisable pattern of deviant behaviour. 
Several scholars have, however, pointed out that there is no unifying pattern of abnormalities 
among people labelled as having schizophrenia that distinguishes them from people with 
other mental health problems, or from people without. Notably Richard Bentall describes 
schizophrenia as a condition with ‘no particular symptoms, no particular course, no particular 
outcome and which responds to no particular treatment’ (3, P 33).  
Kraeplin’s original concept of ‘dementia praecox’ consisted, by definition, of a condition that 
had a progressively deteriorating course. A situation that resolved, or resolved and then 
recurred, was a different condition, even if it was characterised by the same features (12). In 
contrast, Bleuler’s concept of ‘schizophrenia’ was defined not by its trajectory, but by its 
phenomenology, and it was associated, as Bleuler pointed out, with widely different 
outcomes (13). The phenomenology Bleuler considered as characteristic of schizophrenia 
was vague and subjective and, focusing as it does on what we would now call ‘negative 
symptoms,’ it would exclude most people who currently develop psychotic symptoms. 
Subsequent attempts to refine the phenomenology of schizophrenia in order to delineate a 
distinct set of people either resulted in criteria so narrow that they exclude all but a small 
minority of those with severe mental disturbance (Schneider’s first rank symptoms), or so 
broad that they include every situation that confronts mental health services that cannot be 
categorically defined as something else. Despite decades of effort to produce strict and 
replicable criteria for its application, the diagnosis of schizophrenia is as much of a ragbag 
today, as it was in the 1970s when variations in rates of diagnosis across the world caused 
concern.    
Furthermore, diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia explicitly rule out the pattern of symptoms 
separately identified as classical bipolar disorder or manic depression, with periods of 
severely heightened arousal (mania) or severe depression followed by complete remission, 
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and that the psychosis is not a direct and predictable response to taking psychoactive 
substances like cannabis or amphetamines. The diagnosis of ‘schizoaffective disorder’ 
however incorporates people with symptoms associated with both manic depression and 
schizophrenia. It was necessary to invent this diagnosis because of the non-specificity of 
these symptoms. The diagnoses of schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder combined 
therefore designate more or less everyone who shows a psychotic disturbance, apart from a 
small minority who can be labelled categorically as having bipolar disorder or a discrete 
drug-induced episode.  
Despite the heterogeneity of problems embraced by the diagnosis of schizophrenia, it 
continues to convey a message that the condition is life-long, and entails an ongoing need for 
treatment and supervision. A ‘psychotic episode’ may or may not recur, but once it has been 
decided that someone has ‘schizophrenia,’ the expectation is for some degree of ongoing or 
recurrent impairment. This has been a source of grievance for the service user movement, 
among others, who feel that the diagnosis thereby consigns people to a lifetime of deficit and 
dependency (14).  
It is not clear therefore that the term ‘schizophrenia’ adds anything to the use of more general 
terms that describe non-intelligible behaviour such as ‘psychosis,’ and earlier terms including 
madness and insanity. Such concepts can incorporate a variety of symptoms, and do not 
preclude a diversity of outcomes. In medieval law, for example, the concept of ‘insanity’ 
distinguished situations that were thought to involve the possibility of recovery, from 
‘imbecility,’ which was recognised as a lifelong condition (15). 
Implications and alternatives    
Accepting the criticisms of the concept of ‘schizophrenia,’ but recognising that some people 
sometimes act in ways that are bizarre, irrational and occasionally dangerous and disturbing, 
critical psychiatry proponents are trying to explore the significance of calling these situations 
a disease, and to consider less damaging ways in which a civilised society might respond to 
them.  
On the one hand, the medical orientation has entailed some humanitarian advances in the care 
of the mad. Thus, it is generally understood as humane and charitable to excuse a confused or 
profoundly distressed person responsibility for their actions, in the same way that a serious 
medical condition excuses people affected from their normal responsibilities.  Yet, as Szasz 
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frequently protested, the medical model that underpins the modern mental health system also 
disguises the real degree to which it continues to function as an institution of social control, 
providing ‘socially acceptable methods for coping with certain economic, political and 
personal problems which would otherwise have to be dealt with in untried and unfamiliar 
ways’ (1, P 141).  
The authority of medicine, which derives from privileged access to scientific knowledge, 
produces an inevitable power imbalance between doctor and patient. In psychiatry, however, 
the usual justification for this imbalance is lacking, since natural scientific knowledge does 
not extend the understanding of the difficulties a person presents, but merely provides an 
alternative description of those difficulties couched in seemingly technical language.  
In this way, the medical framing of mental disturbance and its management acts as a 
smokescreen behind which the control and manipulation of some people by others can go 
unscrutinised. Interventions aimed at controlling unwanted behaviour, including the 
numerous sedating and tranquilising drugs that are prescribed in mental health care, can be 
rebranded as expert-endorsed medical treatments, which can then be enforced on unwilling 
recipients with impunity. Even those people who are not overtly coerced into accepting 
‘treatment,’ often perceive themselves to have no choice because of the ever-present 
possibility of compulsory measures being applied (16). Moreover, the pseudo-medical 
approach can foster frustrated expectations of therapeutic success, dependency and other 
features of impaired personal agency, stigmatisation and questionable claims for mitigated 
responsibility.  
Social arrangements for the care and containment of mental derangement long pre-date the 
medical paradigm. Plato proposed that ‘if any be a madman, he shall not appear openly in the 
city; the relatives of such persons shall keep them indoors, employing whatever means they 
know of..’ (17, P 443, cited in 18). In 17th century England, local officials were empowered 
to ensure that an individual who was mentally disturbed and felt to be dangerous was locked 
up until he or she recovered. They could require the family to do this, they could make 
arrangements for another local person to do it, or they could order the person to be 
incarcerated in the local gaol or House of Correction (18).  
The same officials that oversaw the safety and security of the community also administered 
local taxes (collected under the Poor Law) and distributed food, clothing and money to those 
in dire need of assistance, including those affected by a mental disorder and their families. 
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Again, neighbours were occasionally enlisted to provide care where the family was unable to 
do so (19). Wealthier families made their own private arrangements for the care of their 
relatives, increasingly turning to private madhouses from the 18th century.  
Clearly many of these arrangements were harsh and we are not recommending that policy 
makers embrace a return to pre-19th century conditions. They do indicate, however, that there 
are other ways of providing support through difficult times than applying the sick role.   
As well as financial assistance, personal care and locked institutions, today we have drugs 
that can suppress and reduce the most dramatic manifestations of mental disturbance for most 
people- although at some cost in terms of personal comfort, physical health, quality of life 
and possibly social functioning (20). None of this requires that mental disturbance be 
regarded as a biological disease. Indeed, many contemporary charities working in this field 
attempt to provide support in ways that avoid the oppressive paternalism of statutory, 
medically oriented services. 
Conclusion 
The current concept of schizophrenia is neither valid nor useful, since it does not map onto an 
identified bodily condition (disease) and it does not describe a predictable pattern of 
behaviour. We suggest a return to a more generic term, such as ‘madness’ or ‘psychosis,’ that 
does not have the implication that the condition it labels is a disease, and which allows the 
unique nature of each individual’s difficulties to be recognised.  Although certain patterns 
might be recognised within this group, such as a paranoid psychotic picture in older, isolated 
women (that which used to be referred to as paraphrenia), and a small minority of cases 
where people show prominent negative symptoms and cognitive impairment in line with 
Kraeplin ’s picture of dementia praecox, these would be acknowledged merely as patterns, 
with no definitive predictive power, and no aetiological implications.  
Divorcing the concept of madness from the idea that it is a disease would necessitate 
legislation that is transparent about its motives. The social control of unwanted behaviour 
would have to be openly and democratically debated, rather than hidden away behind the 
language of medicine and ‘treatment.’ Greater scrutiny of the use of drugs and other 
interventions would be required, since these would not be automatically justified as 
treatments for diseases. The extent to which drugs are used to modify unwanted behaviour in 
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the interests of people other than the patient would have to be acknowledged, and carefully 
circumscribed.   
Modern societies have become dependent on using a medical framework to manage the 
problems arising from irrational and disturbing behaviour, but other arrangements are 
possible. Abandoning the concept of schizophrenia, and the disease theory embedded within 
it, would enable society to develop an approach that was more honest, fairer and more 
transparent.  
 
Key points: 
 The disease model of schizophrenia is not supported by evidence, and obscures the 
real function of psychiatric care  
 The label ‘schizophrenia’ is not associated with a consistent pattern of deviant 
behaviour or outcomes 
 Historically, the care and containment of people with mental and behavioural 
problems were addressed without recourse to the disease framework 
 We need to abandon the disease model in order to develop more transparent and 
democratic mental health services  
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